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brecht v. Herald Co.,1 which prohibited the imposition of maximum
resale prices by a supplier on its resellers.2 Ordinarily, unwise decisions
receive critical reviews and eventually lose their force as they are over-
ruled explicitly or by implication in subsequent decisions.3 In order for
this evolution to occur, however, the Court must be presented with an
opportunity to alter its earlier rulings. Recently, the Supreme Court
had just such an opportunity to revisit the Albrecht rule in Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum (ARCO).4 Although the Court's reason-
ing in ARCO severely restricts some private suits, the Court refused to
overturn Albrecht directly and left standing the shell of the per se doc-
trine.' This is unfortunate because the Albrecht precedent remains on
the books even though it is at odds with the promotion of consumer
welfare. Two undesirable consequences follow. First, businesses avoid
some procompetitive business arrangements for fear of antitrust liabil-
ity.7 Given that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competi-
tion, this is particularly perverse. Second, the lower courts are forced to
rely on standing rules as a means of rejecting claims presented by unde-
serving plaintiffs.8
In this Article we assess the implications of ARCO for the future
vitality of Albrecht. In Part II we review the development and economic
consequences of the Albrecht rule. In Part III we examine the judicial
hostility that has developed in the lower courts toward the anticompeti-
tive nature of the Albrecht rule. In Part IV we analyze the ARCO deci-
sion with respect to substantive antitrust policy and antitrust injury."
1. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). For devastating critiques of the Albrecht rule, see the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices Harlan and Stewart, id. at 156 and 168, respectively.
2. Maximum resale price fixing limits the reseller's ability to increase prices to its customers.
This is in sharp contrast to the typical resale price-maintenance case, in which the manufacturer is
alleged to restrict a reseller's ability to reduce price to its customers. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). In Albrecht the Supreme Court ruled that vertical
maximum price fixing is illegal per se. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
3. The ruling in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), succumbed to
a decade of academic criticism and lower court avoidance in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, in THE SUPREME COURT
RE wEW: 1977 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1978), and Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Eco-
nomic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1977).
4. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
5. That is, the Albrecht court's ruling that vertical maximum price fixing is illegal per se. See
supra note 2. For a justification of this assertion, see infra Part V.
6. For a full analytical development, see Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Con-
sumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 461 (1981). In addition, see Easterbrook,
Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHL L. REv. 886 (1981) (pointing out that maximum resale price
fixing is used to prevent distributors from exploiting their exclusive territories).
7. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 61-112 and accompanying text.
9. Antitrust injury is injury of a type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent; it
flows from the anticompetitive consequences of an antitrust violation. See Brunswick Corp. v.
1008 [Vol. 44:1007
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We then examine the implications of ARCO for the Albrecht rule in
Part V. In doing so, we develop two examples that highlight the mis-
chief caused by the Court's strained reasoning in ARCO and its faulty
reasoning in Albrecht. The concluding section offers two solutions to
the present problems that the Court left unresolved.
II. THE ALBRECHT RULE
To understand the importance of ARCO, we begin with the emer-
gence of the Albrecht rule. After a brief examination of the judicial his-
tory, we provide an economic assessment of this unfortunate decision.
A. Judicial Development of the Albrecht Rule
One can trace the beginnings of the Albrecht rule to the Court's
landmark decision in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.10 In
that case, the major petroleum refiners, in an attempt to prop up the
spot price, agreed to soak up some distress gasoline being sold in the
spot market.1' This strategy served the refiners' interests because the
contracts with their jobbers were formula driven and dependent on the
spot price. 2 Although the major refiners had not agreed on uniform and
inflexible prices, they acted collusively in purchasing gasoline on the
spot market and thereby substantially affected the prices paid by their
jobbers.
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas dismissed as irrelevant
the major refiners' contention that they had not set uniform prices. He
pointed out that any combination which tampers with price structures
is unlawful.' 3 To clarify just how expansive this prohibition was, Justice
Douglas went on to say that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se.'1 4 Thus, the stage was set for the condemna-
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989); Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1445 (1985); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust In-
jury, 47 U. CHL L. REV. 467 (1979-80) [hereinafter Page, Antitrust Damages]; Note, Antitrust
Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 YALE L.J. 1309 (1984); Comment, A
Farewell to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble
Damages Actions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 437 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, A Farewell to Arms]; Note,
Antitrust Injury and Standing: A Question of Legal Cause, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1011 (1983) [herein-
after Note, Antitrust Standing].
10. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11. Id. at 169.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 221.
14. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
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tion of maximum resale price fixing.
Following the Socony- Vacuum decision, the prohibition against de-
pressing prices remained dictum until the Court's 1951 ruling in Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons.15 In response to a horizontal
conspiracy among Kiefer-Stewart and other wholesale liquor dealers to
raise prices, Calvert and Seagram agreed to refuse to sell unless the
wholesalers agreed not to charge more than a specified maximum price.
When Kiefer-Stewart refused to respect these maximum resale prices,
Calvert and Seagram denied it access to their products. Kiefer-Stewart
sued for lost profits on lost sales. The Court ruled in favor of Kiefer-
Stewart and reaffirmed the Socony-Vacuum dictum on the grounds
that agreements to fix maximum resale prices "cripple the freedom of
traders and thereby restrict their ability to sell in accordance with their
own judgment."' 6
Although the generality of the Kiefer-Stewart ruling could be ques-
tioned because of the apparent horizontal agreement between Calvert
and Seagram,' 7 all doubt was removed in Albrecht."s In Albrecht the
Herald Company, publisher of the Globe-Democrat, a St. Louis morn-
ing newspaper, awarded exclusive territories to its carriers. 9 The carri-
ers purchased newspapers at wholesale prices and resold them at retail
prices by providing home-delivery service to subscribers. 20 The pub-
lisher advertised a home-delivered price and required that its carriers
honor that price under threat of termination. Albrecht was a carrier
who charged customers on his route more than the advertised price.2' In
response to Albrecht's price increase, the publisher hired a third party
to solicit subscriptions at the lower published price from Albrecht's cus-
tomers. The publisher also designated a new carrier who took over the
route with the understanding that the publisher would tolerate no un-
authorized price increases and that the carrier might lose the route if
Albrecht reduced his price to the publisher's desired level. During the
ensuing squabble, Albrecht sued the Herald Company, which, in re-
sponse, gave him sixty days' notice to sell his route. Although the
15. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
16. Id. at 213.
17. Calvert and Seagram were not actual horizontal competitors because they were owned by
the same parent. Under current law, they would not be found capable of conspiring with each
other. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
18. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
19. Id. at 147.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 148. The injury claimed was the difference between the actual sale price and the
potential sale price for the route had the Herald Company not taken away some of Albrecht's
subscribers.
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lower courts found no restraint of trade, the Supreme Court reversed
and ruled for Albrecht.2"
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Kiefer-Stewart ruling and con-
demned maximum resale price fixing. The Court explained: "[S]chemes
to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment
of a seller for the forces of the competitive market may severely intrude
upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market. '24
The Court went on to explain how it reached this conclusion:
Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish services essential to
the value which goods have for the consumer or to furnish services and conve-
niences which consumers desire and for which they are willing to pay. Maximum
price fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged
dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. More-
over, if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always
the fixed maximum price ... the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an
arrangement fixing minimum prices.15
Thus, the Court found that fixing maximum resale prices, like agreeing
to fix minimum prices, was illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
B. Economic Assessment of the Albrecht Rule
1. Rationale for Setting Maximum Resale Prices
Examining the economic rationale for the publisher's interest in
setting maximum resale prices reveals the economic consequences of
the Albrecht rule.26 Typically, the daily newspaper publisher is the only
producer of a newspaper of general circulation or local interest in its
area, and, therefore, is viewed as a "monopolist. ' 27 The publisher typi-
cally assigns exclusive home-delivery routes to its carriers. The purpose
of the exclusivity is both to obtain maximum efficiency in the home
delivery of the newspaper and to ensure that service quality is main-
tained. The cost of delivery per paper is minimized by having one car-
rier serve all subscribers along an assigned route. In addition, the
publisher is better able to control the quality of service by providing
subscribers in nearby areas with a single carrier. The danger that this
23. Id. at 148-49.
24. Id. at 152.
25. Id. at 152-53.
26. This rationale is explained fully in R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMIcS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 31-36 (1983).
27. Although some courts have deemed or assumed newspaper publishers to be monopolists
in the sale of newspapers, see, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984), publishers face keen competition in the sale of advertising
space from other media such as television, radio, magazines, billboards, the Yellow Pages, and
direct mail. See, e.g., Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publishing Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
69,082 (D.N.D. 1990).
1991] 1011
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1007
poses, however, is that the carrier will act as a monopolist and charge
what the publisher considers an excessive price. The consequences of
such a price increase are that the distributor's sales go down, resulting
in a decline in the publisher's sales revenue, and more important, de-
prive the publisher of the readership it needs to sell space to advertis-
ers. Under these circumstances, the publisher would like to limit the
distributor's pricing freedom by specifying a maximum home-delivered
price such that the markup over the wholesale price is just equal to the
cost of performing the distribution function.28 If the publisher has no
control over the resale price, however, the distributor may seek monop-
oly profits by increasing the home-delivered price above the sum of the
wholesale price plus the competitive cost of distribution. The result of
the higher home-delivered price is to reduce circulation, thereby caus-
ing the publisher's profits to fall. 9
These concerns are demonstrated in Figure 1, which displays the
demand for home-delivered newspapers as D, the associated marginal
revenue as MR, the marginal (and average) cost of publishing as MCp,
and the hypothetical marginal (and average) cost of the home-delivery
service as MCD.30 This figure describes the hypothetical market condi-
tions on one of the newspaper's exclusive distribution routes.3 1 To de-
termine the price and output of home-delivered newspapers, one must
examine the profit-maximizing behavior of the distributor. Since the
distributor is a monopolist along its assigned route,3 2 it win maximize
28. The cost will include a competitive return on the resources invested in the distribution
enterprise.
29. Newspapers are more complicated than most products because the publisher is selling
both the newspaper to its readers and the advertising space to advertisers. Moreover, the demands
are interdependent. The higher the circulation, the higher the demand for advertising space. Addi-
tionally, the more advertising, the higher the circulation. Thus, a drop in circulation has two im-
pacts on the publisher: (1) a loss in circulation revenue and (2) a loss in advertising, which feeds
back on circulation for another round of decreases. See J. Rosse, Vertical Price Fixing in Newspa-
per Distribution: A Per Se Rule That Makes Everyone Worse Off (May 1980) (unpublished manu-
script). In fact, the typical daily newspaper receives only 20-25% of its revenue from sales of the
newspaper; the balance is derived from sales of advertising space-in reality, readership-to adver-
tisers. See B. COM1AINE, TiE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY IN THE 1980s: AN ASSESSMENT OF EcONOMICS
AND TECHNOLOGY 18-19 (1980).
30. These costs are assumed to be constant. This assumption makes the graphical analysis
less confusing than it would be with more general cost conditions. The results, however, carry over
to more complicated cost conditions.
31. These market conditions are hypothetical in the sense that the typical daily newspaper
publisher does not derive profit from the sale of the newspaper to its readers. In fact, newspaper
sales to readers do not even cover costs since circulation revenue accounts for only 75-80% of the
costs of ink and newsprint. See B. ComPAINE, supra note 29, at 30. The publisher relies on its
readership to permit sales of space to advertisers for profit. We have simplified the analysis here so
it would be consistent with the sale of "single" products such as gasoline.
32. The publisher confers this monopoly power on the carrier because having a single carrier
on each route minimizes the costs of delivery.
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its profits by equating its marginal revenue to its marginal cost, which
is the sum of the wholesale price (p) that the publisher charges and the
marginal cost of the delivery service (MCD). Accordingly, absent the
power of the newspaper publisher to remove the distributor because of
declining sales, profit maximization requires that the distributor deliver
the quantity of newspapers where MR = (p) + MCD. Another way of
looking at this is to equate the wholesale price paid for the newspapers
(p) to the net marginal revenue (MR - MCD). This equality, p = MR-
MCD, describes the derived demand for newspapers by the distributor
along the exclusive route.3 One uses this derived demand to find the
publisher's profit-maximizing wholesale price.
PRICE AND COST
P 1 __
P2, t- P 1 + MCD
Pii
MCP + MCD
D
M D "MC D
MCD
mr \ d = R-
0 Q1 Q2 QUANTITY
Figure 1
In Figure 1, the derived demand is shown as d = MR-MCD and the
associated marginal revenue is mr. The publisher can exploit its monop-
oly power by selecting the price and output where its marginal cost of
publishing (MCp) equals its marginal revenue (mr). Accordingly, the
publisher will produce Q1 newspapers for this route and will charge a
33. The wholesale demand is derived from the demand for newspapers at retail since the
carrier is not a final consumer and, therefore, only wants newspapers for resale.
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wholesale price of Pl. The publisher's resulting profits will be equal to
the difference between the price per paper and the marginal cost (p1 -
MCp) multiplied by the number of papers (Q1). Thus, the publisher's
profit equals (p1 - MCp)Q1 .
The distributor will treat the wholesale price as the marginal cost
of goods sold. By adding this to the marginal (and average) cost of dis-
tribution, the distributor will have the marginal cost of a home-deliv-
ered newspaper. Proceeding in the usual way, the distributor maximizes
its profits in the short run by selling that number of papers (Q1) where
marginal cost (p1 - MCD) equals marginal revenue (MR). 4 The home-
delivered price that corresponds to Q1 is P1. For the distributor, profit
equals the markup (P1 - P, - MCD) multiplied by the number of papers
sold (Q1) or (P1 - p, - MCD)Q1. Thus, the distributor earns excess 6
profits by virtue of its monopoly position along its assigned route. It is
this behavior that leads the newspaper publisher to impose maximum
resale prices.
2. A Numerical Example
A numerical example may help to bring the graphical results into
focus. Suppose that the demand for home-delivered newspapers is rep-
resented by the formula
P = 14 - 0.02Q
and the associated marginal revenue is
MR = 14 - 0.04Q.
The marginal cost of publishing is MCp = 5 and the marginal cost of
delivery is MCD = 1. The derived demand facing the publisher is repre-
sented by the formula
p = MR - MCD
or
p = 14 - 0.04Q - 1
and the marginal revenue associated with this derived demand is
mr = 14 - 0.08Q - 1.
Equating mr with MCp and solving for Q yields
14 - 0.08Q - 1 = 5
or
Q = 100.
Substituting into the derived demand yields a wholesale price of $9.00:
34. It is not a coincidence that the publisher and the carrier select precisely the same num-
ber of newspapers. The publisher's decision on the wholesale price and output takes into account
the profit-maximizing behavior of the distributor.
35. This is not meant to be pejorative. The distributor's profits are excess because they ex-
ceed the level necessary to keep the distributor's resources invested in this industry. In other
words, the distributor's profits will generate a return on investment above the competitive level.
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p = 14 - 0.04(100) - 1= 9
Thus, the publisher's profits are ($9-5)(100) = $400.
The distributor's marginal cost will be the sum of the wholesale
price (p = $9) and the marginal cost of performing the delivery func-
tion (MCD = $1). To maximize its profits, the distributor will equate
its marginal cost with its marginal revenue to find the optimal quantity:
10 - 14 - 0.04Q
or
Q =100.
The home-delivered price is found by substituting the optimal quantity
into the demand curve:
P = 14 - 0.02(100)
or
P= 12.
The distributor's profits are ($12-10)(100) = $200.
3. Maximum Resale Prices
The publisher has an incentive to impose maximum resale prices
on the distributor because of the distributor's excessive markup. The
competitive cost of distribution is MCD, which is the price subscribers
would pay for the delivery service if the carriers did not exercise their
monopoly power. In that case, the price of a home-delivered newspaper
would be the publisher's monopoly wholesale price (pl) plus the margi-
nal cost of delivery (MCD), or P2 = p+ + MCD. At that price, subscrib-
ers purchase Q2 newspapers and the publisher's profits are equal to its
markup of (p1 - MCp) multiplied by the quantity Q2 -i.e., (p1 -
MCp)Q2. Since Q2 is considerably larger than Q1, the publisher obvi-
ously earns more profits. In contrast, the carrier's profit falls to the
competitive level. One way for the publisher to achieve this more desir-
able outcome is to impose maximum resale prices on its carriers. It sells
the newspaper at the wholesale price for P, on the condition that the
resale price not exceed P 2. Thus, the carrier's markup will be limited to
the competitive cost of delivery, MCD.36 The maximum resale price is a
binding constraint on the distributor and, therefore, the home-delivered
price will be the maximum permitted. This, however, does not mean
that "the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement
fixing minimum prices. '3 7 In fact, the maximum resale price ceiling pre-
vents the distributor from charging prices that would flow from an ar-
rangement fixing minimum prices.
36. The distributor will not earn excess profit, but will earn a competitive return on its in-
vestment because a competitive return is considered part of the cost of distribution.
37. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
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In the numerical example outlined above, the publisher would set
its wholesale price at $9 and would set the maximum resale price at
$10, which equals the wholesale price of $9 plus the competitive distri-
bution cost of $1. Substituting P = $10 into demand (P = 14-0.02Q)
and solving for Q yields a quantity of 200. The publisher's profit from
the sale of newspapers alone-without any increase in advertising reve-
nues-is ($9-5)(200) = $800, twice the profit as without the maximum
resale price. The distributor's profit is zero, which is the competitive
level.
4. Economic Consequences
The economic consequences of maximum resale price fixing for the
publisher, the consumer, and the carrier can be summarized as follows.
The publisher is clearly much better off because its profits rise from (p1
- MCp)Q1 to (p1 - MCp)Q2 or from $400 to $800. The subscribers are
better off as well because the number of newspapers sold increases from
Q1 to Q2 (or from 100 to 200) and the price paid decreases from P1 to
P2 (or from $12 to $10). The only loser in all of this is the carrier, whose
profits fall from the monopoly level of (PI - P, - MCD)Q1, or $200, to
the competitive level. Thus, the economic consequence of setting a
maximum resale price is to eliminate the carrier's monopoly profit and
promote consumer welfare. To the extent that the goal of antitrust pol-
icy is the promotion of consumer welfare,38 the Albrecht rule, which
forbids maximum resale price fixing, yields perverse results-consumers
are made worse off.39
In Albrecht the Court of Appeals recognized the problem caused by
exclusive routes and reasoned that a maximum resale price could pro-
tect consumers from price gouging by carriers with monopoly power in
their exclusive territories.40 In dismissing this argument, 41 the Supreme
38. The literature on the goals of antitrust is substantial. For a summary of some of this
literature as it pertains to the Albrecht rule, see Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the
Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 43 (1986). For more general considerations, one should
consult Hovenkamnp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982);
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Inter-
pretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966); Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1965).
39. The publisher's interests and those of the consumer are consistent here. To be sure, it is
the extra profit rather than charitable concern for the welfare of subscribers that motivates the
publisher to impose maximum resale prices. Nonetheless, the consumer benefits from the maxi-
mum resale prices.
40. 390 U.S. at 153-54.
41. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he assertion that illegal price fixing is justified be-
cause it blunts the pernicious consequences of another distribution practice is unpersuasive." Id. at
1016 [Vol. 44:1007
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Court ignored the adverse impact on consumers who had to pay higher
prices. In doing so, the Court enunciated a rule that is clearly inconsis-
tent with the promotion of consumer welfare. 2
C. Evolution of the Albrecht Rule
When Congress passed the Sherman Act43 in 1890, it provided a
legislative skeleton with the intent that the courts were to develop the
judicial muscle.44 For example, Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade."' "4 The Act does not define what constitutes a restraint
of trade. That task was left to the judiciary. As a result, "restraint of
trade" is a term of art that gained its current meaning through a series
of judicial antitrust decisions.'6 In effect, the Sherman Act can be
viewed as enabling legislation that invited the federal courts to develop
a federal common law of business practices that would make businesses
and markets work in socially efficient ways.'7 In doing so, the courts
used the usual techniques of judicial reasoning, considered that reason-
ing in the light of decisions by other common-law courts, and partici-
pated in the evolution of the law in the dynamic common-law
tradition.'8
In the course of common-law evolution, some inefficient rules may
emerge.4' But when legal rules are economically inefficient, the value of
the inefficient rule to its beneficiary is less than the loss to the disad-
vantaged party. As a consequence, the disadvantaged party has more to
154. In this connection, we have to recall that exclusive territories were illegal per se in 1968. See
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
42. Irrespective of which goal or goals one adopts for antitrust, the Albrecht rule cannot be
defended. See Blair & Fesmire, supra note 38.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
44. This, of course, mandated judicial activism, which some have criticized. See, e.g., Arthur,
Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263
(1986).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
46. A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 22 (3d ed. 1980).
47. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 52 (1985).
48. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1 144 (3d ed. 1981).
49. A fascinating series of articles has improved our understanding of the common law's evo-
lutionary process. The seminal piece was provided by Paul Rubin. See Rubin, Why Is the Common
Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). See also Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On
the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986); Priest & Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Blume & Rubinfeld, The Dynam-
ics of the Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1982); Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litiga-
tion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common
Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
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gain than the beneficiary has to lose by a change to an efficient rule.50 If
the litigants have a continuing interest in precedent, they will represent
all future interests in the legal rule in question.5 1 Under these circum-
stances, there will be an incentive for the inefficient rule to be litigated
until precedent is changed and an efficient rule emerges.52
The preceding section demonstrated the economic inefficiency of
the Albrecht rule s.5  The only beneficiaries of the rule are the distribu-
tors who are exploiting the monopoly power along their exclusive deliv-
ery routes. The publisher and the consumers are worse off. The
publisher earns fewer profits and consumers pay higher prices and buy
fewer papers. It can be shown that the losses are larger than the gains54
and, therefore, the stage is set for the common-law evolution to occur.
Subsequent litigation should lead to a change in the legal rule, but this
has not transpired for at least two reasons. First, the conditions neces-
sary for potentially correcting litigation have not been present.55 Sec-
ond, there are at least three alternatives to fixing maximum resale
prices that may not be as simple or as efficient, but nonetheless pose
fewer antitrust risks.56 Thus, the publisher has less incentive to chal-
lenge the Albrecht rule than one might suppose.
As a result of the strength of precedent,57 the high costs of litiga-
tion,"8 and the availability of legally less risky alternatives, 59 litigation
50. In Figure 1, the inefficient rule provides the distributor with profits of (P1 - P 1 - MCD)Q1,
but reduces the publisher's profits by more than that. In the numerical example, the gain to the
distributor was $200 while the loss to the publisher was $400.
51. Rubin, supra note 49, for a fuller discussion of this issue.
52. In practice, contingent fees, treble damages, joint and several liability, and the like create
complications for this analysis.
53. The economic inefficiency is explained carefully in R BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST
ECONoMics 342-49 (1985).
54. In Figure 1, the increase in the publisher's profit that results from maximum resale prices
is equal to (p, - MCp)(Q 2 - Q1). This exceeds the carrier's profit of (P - p, - MCD)Q. A formal
proof of this proposition is provided in R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 26, at 34-35. In our
numerical example the increased publisher's profits are $400 while the reduced carrier profits are
$200.
55. The condition necessary for litigation to ensue is that the probability of a successful law-
suit by the disadvantaged firm multiplied by the dollar value of the inefficiency must exceed the
litigation costs of both parties. Blair & Schafer, Evolutionary Models of Legal Change and the
Albrecht Rule, 32 ANTrITRUST BULL. 989, 1002 (1987).
56. The supplier could vertically integrate, implement performance standards, or engage in
dual distribution. In principle, each of these can provide economically equivalent results with re-
duced antitrust exposure. Id.; see Blair & Fesmire, supra note 38, at 59-67. They are not necessa-
rily perfect substitutes in practice, however, due to differences in the costs of implementing these
approaches. See Blair & Kaserman, supra note 6, at 479-82.
57. The strength of the precedent is exhibited by the per se illegality of vertical maximum
price fixing.
58. The costs of litigating antitrust suits are notoriously high. Costs per case in excess of $1
million are not uncommon and even the cases that are resolved quickly involve costs in the
$400,000 range. See Teplitz, The Georgetown Project: An Overview of the Data Set and Its Col-
lection, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 61-81 (L. White ed. 1988).
59. See supra note 56 and sources cited therein.
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to overturn Albrecht has not been substantial. Nevertheless, several
lower courts have demonstrated hostility toward the anticompetitive re-
sults of the Albrecht rule.
III. JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TOWARD ALBRECHT
Although most of the lower courts have continued to recognize for-
mally the Albrecht holding,60 several courts have blunted its force by
awarding only nominal damages. Prior to ARCO, this was particularly
true in newspaper distribution cases. 1 To understand the importance
of this reaction, the following section briefly examines the concepts be-
hind antitrust damages and antitrust injury.
A. Antitrust Damages and Antitrust Injury
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 2 provides in relevant part that "[a]ny
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained. s6  Thus, private par-
ties assist in the enforcement of the antitrust laws through private suits
for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of antitrust violations .6
While a literal reading of Section 4 suggests that an extensive array of
private parties could sue for a multitude of actual injuries, 5 the courts
have restricted those who have standing to sue6 and the types of inju-
ries67 that are compensable.6 8 We argue below that the putative victims
60. The Seventh Circuit has been a notable exception. See infra notes 102-12 and accompa-
nying text.
61. An interesting examination of vertical price fixing in newspapers is provided in
Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the Newspaper Monopolist, 69 IowA L. REv. 451 (1984).
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
64. PRIvATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (L. White ed. 1988) provides an extremely interesting em-
pirical view of private suits.
65. For example, when widget manufacturers fix prices, the quantity sold is necessarily re-
duced. This imposes injury upon all of their input suppliers, employees who are laid off, firms that
transport raw materials to the manufacturers and those that transport the finished widgets to their
customers, and so on. The ripple effect is substantial, but these injured parties cannot sue for
damages.
66. Antitrust standing identifies those who may sue. Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), establish
that only those suffering direct injury may sue. Added specificity flowed from the Court's rulings in
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) and Associated General Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). See also In re Wyoming Tight Sands
Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Kansas v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 833 (1990).
67. Antitrust injury identifies those harms that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and, therefore, are compensable under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). See Blair & Harrison, supra note 10.
68. Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 9, and Comment, A Farewell to Arms, supra note
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of maximum resale price fixing do not suffer antitrust injury and, there-
fore, should not be able to sue for damages.
The antitrust injury doctrine began with the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.61 In the late 1950s
Brunswick's sale of bowling lanes, automatic pinsetters, and related
equipment soared along with the popularity of bowling as family en-
tertainment. Brunswick financed a good deal of its sales by extending
credit to the bowling alley operators. When bowling's popularity waned
in the 1960s, Brunswick's sales fell. In addition, some of the bowling
centers Brunswick financed defaulted on their loans. As a result, Bruns-
wick repossessed the equipment, but had limited success in reselling or
leasing it. Facing financial difficulties of its own, Brunswick began to
acquire and operate the failing bowling centers as a way of salvaging
something financially.
Pueblo was a rival bowling center not affiliated with Brunswick. It
filed suit under Section 7 of the Clayton Act claiming that the acquisi-
tions were potentially anticompetitive. Pueblo's theory was that
Brunswick's superior size enabled it to reduce competition by driving
smaller rivals out of business. Although there was no evidence that
Brunswick had actually driven rivals out, a jury agreed that Brunswick
had the ability to do so. Thus, the jury found that Brunswick's acquisi-
tions violated Section 7. Pueblo then claimed damages that resulted
from the acquisition. It identified these damages as the additional prof-
its that it would have earned if Brunswick had allowed the acquired
bowling centers to fail. In other words, absent Brunswick's acquisitions,
Pueblo would have faced less competition, enjoyed a larger market
share, and earned more profit.
The Supreme Court agreed that Pueblo's profits were lower than
they would have' been absent Brunswick's illegal acquisition. Thus,
there was no dispute over whether Pueblo had suffered injury in fact.
The Court, however, ruled that Pueblo had not suffered an injury that
was compensable under the antitrust laws. Since the antitrust laws were
9, provide useful surveys of early decisions.
69. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). This ruling was anticipated in Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without
Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1127 (1976).
70. The Act provides in relevant part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corpo-
ration engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
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enacted to promote and protect competition, not competitors, it would
have been perverse to compensate Pueblo for the extra profits it would
have earned if competition had been reduced. The Court explained the
fundamental nature of antitrust injury:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defend-
ants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of
the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.7 1
To apply the antitrust injury doctrine, one must first identify the anti-
competitive effects of a particular violation. Then, one must determine
the logical copsequences of those anticompetitive effects. If a plaintiff
has been injured in its business or property due to the anticompetitive
effects of an antitrust violation, then it would have suffered antitrust
injury under the Brunswick rule. Any injury that is not a consequence
of the anticompetitive effects of an antitrust violation would not be an-
titrust injury and, therefore, would not be compensable under the reme-
dial provisions of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
B. Antitrust Injury and the Albrecht Rule
It is readily apparent that the victim of maximum resale price fix-
ing has not suffered antitrust injury. Figure 1 demonstrates that maxi-
mum resale price fixing reduces the price to subscribers from P1 to P 2.
As a result, the carrier's profits fall from (P1 - P, - MCD)Q1 to zero.2
The carrier has unquestionably suffered an injury to its business or
property. This, however, is simply injury in fact; it is not antitrust in-
jury. The injury at issue flows from the procompetitive consequences of
the restraint."3 Since the harm flows from an increase in the number of
newspapers sold from Q1 to Q2, the publisher's behavior has improved
efficiency. 74 The purpose and effect of maximum resale price fixing is
not to restrain competition; rather, it is to prevent distributors from
exploiting their exclusive territories.7 5 Phillip Areeda and Donald Tur-
ner have concluded that "[i]t seems most doubtful that the purposes of
the antitrust laws are served by awarding damages for the impairment
of the plaintiff's monopoly power over newspaper subscribers. '76
71. 429 U.S. at 489,
72. In the numerical example the carrier's profits fell from $200 to zero. It must be recalled,
however, that the carrier earns a normal return on his investment of time and other resources in
the route because these opportunity costs are included in his cost function.
73. In fact, the restraint yields the same price and quantity combination that would flow
from competition at the distribution stage. The markup over the wholesale cost of the newspapers
is limited to the competitive cost of distribution.
74. Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 9, at 492 & n.96.
75. Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 890 n.20.
76. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW 347 (1978).
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To illustrate the point, consider the damage claim in Albrecht. Al-
brecht had to sell his exclusive route for less than it would have been
worth if the Herald Company had not intervened and caused Albrecht
to lose customers.7 Thus, he sued for the reduced value of his business.
But, as William Page points out, the size of the reduction in the route's
value was equal to the capitalized profits that flow from the route's ex-
clusivity.7 8 Brunswick teaches us that an award based on the loss of
monopoly profits is improper. This is not the kind of injury that the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
Justices Harlan and Stewart wrote dissenting opinions in Albrecht
that clearly displayed serious flaws in the majority's reasoning.79 Justice
Harlan distinguished maximum resale price fixing from resale price
maintenance, which limits price reductions. He pointed out that a
newspaper publisher would like to have the newspapers delivered for
the lowest possible cost because that yields the lowest overall price to
the subscribers and the largest circulation. Imposing a price ceiling on
the carriers contributes to this objective. 0 He went on to explain that
price ceilings "do not lessen horizontal competition; they drive prices
toward the level that would be set by intense competition, and they
cannot go below this level unless the [publisher] who dictates them and
the [carrier] who accepts them have both miscalculated." 81 Moreover,
maximum resale prices arguably prevent the carriers from reaping mo-
nopoly or supracompetitive profits.82 Justice Stewart also insisted that
if the Herald Company prevented Albrecht from charging higher prices
than would have existed in a competitive market, the Herald Com-
pany's "actions were fully compatible with the antitrust laws." 83
C. Judicial Response
In Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc.14 terminated news dealers com-
plained about a clause in their written contracts that expressly fixed the
resale price of the newspaper. The district court held that under Al-
brecht the contract violated the Sherman Act, but that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish the fact or amount of damages.85 After the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and found the plaintiffs had proved
77. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
78. Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 9, at 491.
79. 390 U.S. at 156-68 and 168-70, respectively.
80. Id. at 157-58.
81. Id. at 159.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 169. Stewart went on to say that "[t]he Court today stands the Sherman Act on its
head." Id. at 170.
84. 383 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
85. Id. at 1376, 1388.
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the fact of damages,8 6 the district court determined that the plaintiffs
were entitled to only nominal damages.8 7
The plaintiff dealers, the court found, were aware of the publisher's
need to keep subscription prices low to maximize its number of sub-
scribers and, in turn, to obtain higher advertising revenues."8 The plain-
tiffs were also aware that if they raised prices, the publisher was likely
to terminate their contracts, change distribution systems (as in fact it
did after receiving a complaint from a dealer about the price-fixing
clause), or take other action to terminate their position as independent
distributors.8 9 The plaintiffs were not entitled to more than nominal
damages, the court found, because given their knowledge of the eco-
nomics of the newspaper business, they would not have raised their
prices, "even if they had been free to do so.''9s
Foreshadowing arguments that would later be addressed in ARCO,
Judge Renfrew wrote that the Court of Appeals' decision that the plain-
tiffs had proved the fact of damage "might be subject to some dispute"
because the "alleged loss probably was not of 'the type that the statute
was intended to forestall'-:91
[Ilt is not unreasonable to conclude that defendants' maximum resale price re-
straint had a pro-competitive effect and that price freedom would have had anti-
competitive consequences. By seeking the removal of the resale price restrictions,
plaintiffs sought the power to increase profits by raising subscription prices in their
areas of distribution. However, because each plaintiff had a de facto monopoly in
his or her area, these increased profits could only be characterized as monopoly
rents. The result of lifting the price ceiling would therefore be to encourage each
dealer's fortification and exploitation of his or her particular monopoly. . . . This
analysis suggests that although plaintiffs' alleged losses may be of the type that the
claimed violation would be likely to cause, they are not of the type that the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent.92
In Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb9" the court noted that
"maximum vertical price-fixing arguably benefits consumers, the in-
tended beneficiaries of the antitrust laws,"'94 but held under Albrecht
that an express maximum price-fixing clause in contracts between the
defendant newspaper publisher and the plaintiff distributors was illegal
per se. The court held, however, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
86. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977).
87. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226, 240 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id. at 240.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 230-31. Renfrew appears to have been confused by the distinction between injury
in fact and antitrust injury.
92. Id. at 232 n.7.
93. 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 475.
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damages. The plaintiffs would not have raised their prices even if they
had been permitted to do so, the court held, because they had the "so-
phistication" to understand that if they had raised prices, they would
have been terminated. 5
In Newberry v. Washington Post Co.96 the court ruled that distrib-
utors who had not raised their prices were entitled to only nominal
damages, even though they had a price-fixing agreement with the pub-
lisher that prohibited them from charging more than the published
price.9 7 These plaintiffs were not entitled to more than nominal dam-
ages because there was no proof of when the plaintiffs would have
raised their prices, what prices they would have charged, and what the
subscriber response to the price increase would have been.9 8
Furthermore, even when the lower courts followed Albrecht, they
were sympathetic to the changes in business practices that Albrecht en-
gendered.99 Faced with the prospect of decreasing circulation and ad-
vertising revenues due to excessive distributor pricing, many publishers
chose to terminate their independent distributors and replace them ei-
ther with their own employees or with delivery agents. Such vertical
integration by the publisher yields roughly the same economic results as
a vertical maximum price-fixing agreement. In each case, the publisher
determines the price to the consumer. 10 0 The courts uniformly have up-
held such vertical integration by newspaper distributors against federal
antitrust challenges. 101
The most direct assault on Albrecht was launched in two Seventh
Circuit decisions, Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc.102
and Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.0 3 In Jack Wal-
ters a building and materials dealer alleged that a manufacturer of pre-
fabricated farm houses and the manufacturer's dealers conspired to fix
95. Id. at 476-77.
96. 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977).
97. Id. at 483.
98. Id.
99. For a survey of the newspaper cases, see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRUST LAW
729.7 (Supp. 1988).
100. See, e.g., Blair & Fesmire, supra note 38, and Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws
to Newspaper Distribution Systems: The Sherman Act Turned on Its Head, 38 U. FLA. L. REv.
479 (1986).
101. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Chicago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1988); Belfiore v. New
York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988); Paschall v. Kansas
City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984); Auburn News
Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976); Ampar Enterprises v. Reno Newspapers, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1670 (D.
Nev. 1982); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977); Lamarca v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 395 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1975).
102. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984).
103. 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989).
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maximum resale prices.0 4 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant. 105 On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff
had not proven a vertical price-fixing agreement between the manufac-
turer and the competing dealers. 108 The court then made two additional
points. First, it stated that whether vertical maximum price fixing was
illegal per se seemed to be "an open question.' 0 7 The court noted that
although exclusive territories were illegal per se at the time Albrecht
was decided, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.0 8 subse-
quently established that exclusive territories were subject to the rule of
reason. Therefore, the court reasoned that "a manufacturer-imposed
price ceiling intended to limit the power that exclusive territories give
dealers to raise prices . . . may also be lawful." 0 9
Second, the court found that even if the manufacturer had engaged
in price fixing, the dealer did not have standing to bring suit because it
had not suffered antitrust injury as a result of the price-fixing agree-
ment. Judge Posner found that the only harm to Walters resulted from
the fact that competing dealers would lower their prices to consumers if
Walters did not. Walters presented no evidence that the lower prices
would have been below cost and were thus unlawful. Judge Posner con-
cluded that Walters could not "complain about having to meet lawful
price competition, which antitrust law seeks to encourage, merely be-
cause the competition may have been enabled by an antitrust
violation." 110
In Indiana Grocery a supermarket chain alleged that a competing
chain and that chain's supplier had engaged in maximum resale price
maintenance. A different Seventh Circuit panel held that, as in Jack
Walters, the complaining dealer had not suffered antitrust injury, and
thus did not have standing to make a vertical maximum price-fixing
claim."1 The court rejected the argument that it was bound by Al-
104. 737 F.2d at 701.
105. 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 65,284 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
106. 737 F.2d at 708.
107. Id. at 707.
108. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
109. 737 F.2d at 706. Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp reviewed Jack Walters and
found that "[t]he reduction in the plaintiff's price-cost margin is not an injury to competition." P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAP, supra note 99, at I 335.2h. In footnote 56 they went on to explain that
vertical maximum price fixing is virtually never anticompetitive. It is designed to prevent resellers
from exercising monopoly power. In order to show an injury to competition, a plaintiff would have
to prove that the price was higher or that the output was lower. In general, such a burden of proof
cannot be met. Id.
110. 737 F.2d at 709. One judge concurred in the decision that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished a vertical maximum price-fixing claim, but not in the court's broader discussion, which he
found to be dicta. Id. at 713 (Swygert, J., concurring).
111. "The antitrust laws simply are not in the business of protecting higher-pricing grocers
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brecht to grant the dealers standing because Albrecht was decided nine
years before the court formulated the antitrust injury requirement in
Brunswick and did not address the issues of antitrust injury or anti-
trust standing.'12
In the newspaper distribution cases, and in the Seventh Circuit's
Jack Walters and Indiana Grocery decisions, none of the courts ex-
pressly reversed Albrecht. Moreover, in several of the newspaper distri-
bution cases, the courts purported to follow it."s Nevertheless, through
sophisticated damage analysis and the concept of antitrust injury, these
courts succeeded in largely immunizing those manufacturers who en-
gaged in vertical maximum price fixing from damage liability, and in
some cases from private civil suit.
Although Congress has not enacted legislation to overrule Albrecht,
it too has shown uneasiness with the Albrecht rule. In 1988, in response
to the Supreme Court's rulings in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp."4 and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.," 5
the Senate considered a bill that would have established standards of
proof for vertical price-fixing agreements and codified the applicability
of the per se rule to such agreements. Several senators criticized the
bill, specifically noting the deleterious effects of a ban on vertical maxi-
mum price fixing on newspaper publishers and subscribers. The bill was
amended on the Senate floor to remove vertical maximum price-fixing
agreements from the scope of the legislation. 6 In the 101st Congress,
the successor Senate bill and a similar House bill excluded vertical
maximum price-fixing agreements from the proposed per se codifica-
tion." ' In the most recent Congress, the Senate's version of the legisla-
tion specifically provided that vertical maximum price fixing is subject
to the rule of reason."18
IV. THE ARCO DECISION
The ARCO case began in May 1983 when USA Petroleum (USA),
an independent retail gasoline seller, brought suit against Atlantic
Richfield Company (ARCO)." 9 ARCO was an integrated oil company
from lower-pricing competition." 864 F.2d at 1419-20.
112. Id. at 1420.
113. See cases cited supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
114. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
115. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
116. S. 430, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S12492 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (intro-
ducing Rudman Amendment No. 3037).
117. The House bill, H.R. 1236, passed the House of Representatives on April 18, 1990, and
was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
118. S. 429, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. 85605 (daily ed. May 9, 1991).
119. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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that sold gasoline to consumers through its own stations and also sold
gasoline to ARCO-brand retail dealers. USA alleged that ARCO con-
spired with the ARCO-brand dealers to sell gasoline at artificially low
and uncompetitive levels in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and attempted to monopolize the local retail gasoline market in viola-
tion of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.12 USA claimed that through a
vertical maximum price-fixing conspiracy, ARCO and its dealers had
taken sales from USA and other independent sellers, driving indepen-
dent sellers from the market. 12 1
The district court dismissed the Section 2 claim. USA's complaint
alleged that the market would be dominated by the major oil compa-
nies, and thus there was no dangerous probability that a single firm,
ARCO, would be successful in monopolizing the market. 22 The district
court later granted summary judgment on USA's vertical maximum
price-fixing claim, holding that even if the plaintiffs could prove such a
price-fixing agreement, the plaintiff could not satisfy the antitrust in-
jury requirement of the Clayton Act, Section 4 without showing such
prices to be predatory.123 USA could make no such showing of preda-
tory prices, the court held, because ARCO's share of the retail gasoline
market was low (never more than seventeen percent), and even if the
market were limited to only discount gasoline sellers, there were several
potential entrants whose existence prevented ARCO and its dealers
from exercising monopoly power. 24
USA appealed the grant of summary judgment, but not the court's
finding that the allegedly fixed prices were not predatory. The Ninth
Circuit panel thus framed the issue as "whether in the absence of proof
of predatory pricing a competitor can recover damages because of a
maximum resale price maintenance agreement.' 1 25 A divided court
found that one could and reversed. According to the majority, the in-
quiry was "straightforward":
The "antitrust injury" standard requires us to determine whether the plaintiff's
injuries resulted from a disruption of competition in the plaintiff's market caused
120. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part:
(e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
121. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1887, 1888 (1990).
122, 577 F. Supp. at 1304. USA then amended its § 2 claim, but voluntarily dismissed that
claim with prejudice after ARCO moved for summary judgment. See 110 S. Ct. at 1888 n.3.
123. 577 F. Supp. at 1307.
124. Id. at 1304. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), the Supreme Court ruled that an inference of predatory pricing will not be sustained when
predation is not economically plausible.
125. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1988).
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by the defendant's antitrust violation. . .. In the present case the inquiry seems
straightforward: USA's claimed injuries were the direct result, and, indeed, under
the allegations we accept as true, the intended objective, of ARCO's price-fixing
scheme. According to USA, the purpose of ARCO's price-fixing is to disrupt the
market of retail gasoline sales, and that disruption is the source of USA's
injuries.126
The court found that, if USA's allegations were true, ARCO had re-
duced competition by reducing the number of independent gasoline re-
tailers.127 The court determined that financial losses allegedly suffered
by USA and its forced exit from the market due to ARCO's illegal price
fixing were the types of injuries that the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent. 12 The court recognized that its decision was contrary to that
of the Seventh Circuit in Jack Walters, but simply disagreed, stating
that "the competitive process can only rule when participants in the
process are not allowed to combine to fix prices ahead of time."12 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 130 As in the Ninth Circuit,
however, the issue to be decided by the Court was limited. Although
ARCO had suggested in its petition for certiorari that the Court could
reconsider the per se treatment of vertical maximum price fixing "if it
believes that it now is necessary and appropriate,"'13 neither ARCO nor
the federal enforcement agencies petitioned the Court to overrule Al-
brecht. Thus, the question before the Court was whether a firm incurs
an "'injury' within the meaning of the antitrust laws when it loses sales
to a competitor charging nonpredatory prices pursuant to a vertical,
maximum price-fixing scheme.' 3 2 In an opinion written by Justice
Brennan and joined by *six other Justices, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision and held that a firm does not suffer antitrust injury
from a vertical maximum price-fixing scheme involving its
competitor.1 3
The Court's analysis began with a repetition of its holding in
Brunswick and subsequent cases that a private plaintiff must prove the
existence of "antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
126. Id. at 693.
127. Id. at 696.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 697. Judge Alarcon dissented, on the grounds that "USA's loss of profits from
Atlantic Richfield's vigorous competition is not antitrust injury." Id. at 704 (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
130. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).
131. Atlantic Richfield Petition for Certiorari at 15, n.5, ARCO, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990) (No.
88-1668).
132. ARCO 110 S. Ct. at 1887.
133. Id. at 1895.
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makes the defendants' acts unlawful.""13 The Court then summarized
its Albrecht holding, stating in a footnote that "we assume arguendo,
that Albrecht correctly held that vertical, maximum price-fixing is sub-
ject to the per se rule." 135
The vertical maximum price-fixing scheme in Albrecht was illegal
per se, the Court stated, "because it threatened to inhibit vigorous com-
petition by the dealers bound by it and because it threatened to become
a minimum price-fixing scheme."'3 6 The Court then reviewed the four
reasons given in Albrecht for applying the per se rule to vertical maxi-
mum price fixing: (1) "by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment
of a seller for the forces of the competitive market, [vertical maximum
price fixing] may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete
and survive in that market"; 13 7 (2) "[mlaximum prices may be fixed too
low for the dealer to furnish services essential to the value which goods
have for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences which
consumers desire and for which they are willing to pay";'-'a (3) "[b]y
limiting the ability of small dealers to engage in nonprice competition, a
maximum price-fixing agreement might 'channel distribution through a
few large or specifically advantaged dealers' ,,;139 and (4) "if the actual
price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the fixed
maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum price ap-
proaches the actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all
the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices. 1 0
The Court then sought to distinguish USA's situation from Al-
brecht. The conduct in Albrecht was unlawful per se "because of its
potential effects on dealers and consumers, not because of its effects on
competitors."'' 41 The Court found, largely as the government's amicus
brief urged, that USA had not suffered any of the injuries to competi-
tion recognized in Albrecht. If ARCO's alleged maximum price-fixing
agreement set prices that were too low for ARCO's dealers to furnish
services desired by consumers, such as credit card sales, or that resulted
134. Id. at 1889 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
135. Id. at 1889 n.5. The Court described Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), as "the
only case in which the Court has confronted an unadulterated vertical, maximum price-fixing ar-
rangement." Id. at 1890 n.6.
136. Id. at 1889.
137. Id. at 1890 (citing Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152).
138. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1890 (citing Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53).
139. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1890 (citing Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153). In fact, the Court's rewrite
of the third factor was substantial: the Albrecht Court was concerned that channeling "distribu-
tion through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers would eliminate non-price competition
among them," 390 U.S. at 153, not that eliminating such competition would lead to a few large
dealers.
140. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1890 (citing Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153).
141. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1890.
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in the channeling of business to large distributors, then competing firms
would be benefited rather than harmed. USA similarly would have ben-
efited had the alleged maximum price-fixing agreement ultimately ac-
quired the attributes of a minimum price-fixing scheme, because ARCO
dealers charging higher prices would have worked to USA's advantage.
In fact, the complaint's allegation that the price-fixing scheme enabled
ARCO's dealers to increase their sales was an assertion that the dangers
with which the Court was concerned in Albrecht had not materialized
in the instant case. USA did not suffer antitrust injury, the Court con-
cluded, because "its losses do not flow from the aspects of vertical, max-
imum price-fixing that render it illegal."'142
Having found, as a matter of fact, that USA did not suffer the inju-
ries discussed in Albrecht, the Court then explained that the injuries
which USA alleged it did suffer, and which the Court accepted as true,
did not constitute antitrust injury. First, the Court held, as a matter of
law, that
[w]hen a firm, or even a group of firms adhering to a vertical agreement, lowers
prices but maintains them above predatory levels, the business loss by rivals can
not be viewed as an "anticompetitive" consequence of the claimed violation. A firm
complaining about the harm it suffers from non-predatory price competition "is
really claiming that it [is] unable to raise prices." (citation omitted) This is not
antitrust injury; indeed "cutting prices in order to increase business often is the
very essence of competition."
Although a vertical, maximum price-fixing agreement is unlawful under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, it does not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless it results in
predatory pricing. Antitrust injury does not arise ... until a private party is ad-
versely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's conduct. . . . Low
prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they
are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition. Hence, they can not
give rise to antitrust injury.14 3
The Court rejected USA's argument that antitrust injury need not
be shown for a per se violation. Per se violations "may have some
procompetitive effects,"144 which might nevertheless harm private par-
ties. "The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can re-
cover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect
of the defendant's behavior.''1 45
Although the issue before the Court was narrow, it nevertheless ex-
amined the merits of Albrecht. In a long footnote the Court largely ac-
cepted the proposition of the Albrecht dissenters that vertical
142. Id. at 1890-91.
143. Id. at 1891, 1891-92 (in part citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort & Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S.
104, 116 (1986)).
144. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1894.
145. Id. This ruling follows the advice offered by Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, T 334.2C.
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maximum price fixing protects consumers from the monopoly power
wielded by exclusive-territory distributors:
When a manufacturer provides a dealer an exclusive area within which to dis-
tribute a product, the manufacturer's decision to fix a maximum resale price may
actually protect consumers against exploitation by the dealer acting as a local
monopolist. The manufacturer acts not out of altruism, of course, but out of a de-
sire to increase its own sales-whereas the dealer's incentive, like that of any mo-
nopolist, is to reduce output and increase price. If an exclusive dealership is the
most efficient means of distribution, the public is not served by forcing the manu-
facturer to abandon this method and resort to self-distribution or competing dis-
tributors. Vertical, maximum price-fixing thus may have procompetitive interbrand
effects even if it is per se illegal because of its potential effects on dealers and
consumers.
146
Although the Court gave something to Albrecht's critics, it also
gave something to its supporters. In closing its opinion, the Court
stated that providing a cause of action for competing dealers was un-
necessary147 because the manufacturer's own dealers and consumers
might sue "if such a scheme causes the anticompetitive consequences
detailed in Albrecht.'4 a
Justice Stevens, joined by Albrecht author Justice White, dis-
sented. By driving competitors out of business, they argued, ARCO's
scheme could reduce competition or potential competition "in the long-
run."149 Justice Stevens found that USA had suffered antitrust injury
because Section 1 was intended to forbid price-fixing conspiracies
designed to drive competitors out of the market.5" The dissenters con-
ceded, however, that "a price agreement that is ancillary to an exclusive
distributorship might protect consumers from an attempt by the dis-
tributor to exploit its limited monopoly.' 5
In ARCO the Court-like the lower courts in the newspaper distri-
bution cases, and in Jack Walters and Indiana Grocery-did not re-
verse Albrecht. In fact, the question of whether Albrecht should be
overruled was not before the Court. What the Court did do, much like
the Seventh Circuit in Jack Walters, was limit Albrecht's force by
denying standing to one group of persons, and undermine its rationale
146. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1894 n.13. In Albrecht the majority assumed that the exclusive
territorial agreements between the publisher and the distributors were unlawful. Justices Douglas
and Harlan, concurring and dissenting, respectively, argued that such agreements were subject to
the rule of reason. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154, 157 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring,
and Harlan, J., dissenting, respectively).
147. The government made this argument with respect to price-fixing dealers in its amicus
brief. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 21 & n.15, ARCO, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990) (No. 88-
1668).
148. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1895.
149. Id. at 1896 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1897 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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by recognizing the procompetitive aspects of vertical maximum price-
fixing agreements.
V. ALBRECHT AFTER ARCO
What now remains of Albrecht? Four conclusions follow directly:
First, although the Court's assumption arguendo that Albrecht's hold-
ing was correct is no ringing endorsement, many lower federal courts
may feel bound by precedent to hold that vertical maximum price-fix-
ing agreements remain illegal per se. Second, because Section 4 of the
Clayton Act"'5 -and thus the antitrust injury requirement-does not
apply to enforcement actions by the Justice Department or the Federal
Trade Commission, the ability of those agencies to bring suits challeng-
ing vertical maximum price-fixing agreements remains unimpaired.153
Third, ARCO provides the equivalent of a per se rule that competing
dealers do not suffer antitrust injury as a result of nonpredatory verti-
cal maximum price-fixing agreements between other competing dealers
and those competing dealers' supplier. Thus, such competing dealers'
suits should be effectively barred. Fourth, other dealers or consumers
who wish to bring suits on vertical maximum price-fixing claims will
have to prove, in addition to the violation, that they were injured by
the anticompetitive aspects of the maximum price-fixing agreement and
not by the procompetitive effects of the agreement.
Unless-or perhaps until-the Court reverses Albrecht, the prob-
lem of interpreting the requirement of "antitrust injury" must still be
faced. The Court described antitrust injury as being "adversely affected
by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's conduct," 5" as losses
that "stem from an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's con-
duct,"" and as a loss that "stems from a competition-reducing aspect
or effect of the defendant's behavior. '156
152. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 4, which authorizes the United States to bring actions to prevent and re-
strain violations of the Sherman Act, does not require that the government be injured in its busi-
ness or property by reason of an antitrust violation. By contrast, a state government would have to
show antitrust injury in a treble damage action. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988) (providing that state
attorneys general may seek monetary relief for injuries "by reason of any violation" of the Sher-
man Act (emphasis added)). The likelihood of the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice De-
partment bringing an action against vertical maximum price fixing is remote, at least in the short
run. The Department of Justice has not initiated any vertical restraint case since fiscal year 1981.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ON CHANGES IN
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND AcTIvrrIEs OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, 59 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP., No. 1495 at S-34. Cf. Kreepy Krauly USA, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. 1813 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n 1991) (proposed consent order barring resale price maintenance).
154. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1892 (1990) (emphasis in original).
155. Id. (emphasis in original)
156. Id. at 1894 (emphasis in original).
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One could reasonably argue that, under the analysis employed in
ARCO, there are no anticompetitive or competition-reducing aspects of
nonpredatory vertical maximum price-fixing agreements. If, as the
Court stated, low prices do not cause antitrust injury to competing
dealers because "[1]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those
prices are set, ' 157 those same prices should not cause antitrust injury
simply because the complaining person is now the dealer through whom
the vertical, price-fixing agreement was enforced (such as the ARCO-
brand dealers in ARCO), or a consumer who received lower prices and
thus benefited (and had no injury in fact) from the vertical price-fixing
agreement.15 8
The Court did not need to lay down such a broad rule in ARCO,
however, and in dicta suggested it was not doing so: if a nonpredatory
vertical maximum price-fixing scheme "causes the anticompetitive con-
sequences detailed in Albrecht, consumers and the manufacturers' own
dealers may bring suit."159 Reading this dicta broadly, and in a vacuum,
one might contend that a dealer would have incurred the requisite anti-
trust injury if it could prove it suffered one of the anticompetitive con-
sequences detailed in Albrecht-presumably the four factors identified
by the Court in ARCO. As examined below, this reading could not be
what the Court intended because it conflicts both with the proconsumer
rationale of the ARCO opinion and the Court's express recognition of
the competitive benefits of vertical maximum price fixing.
A. Example 1: Exclusive Distributorships
For example, consider the situation that is most common in the
daily newspaper industry today. The newspaper publisher produces the
only daily newspaper in its area, which includes national and local
news, information, and advertising. The publisher sells its newspaper to
independent distributors who in turn resell the newspaper to consum-
ers. The newspaper distributors have exclusive routes-that is, defined
geographic areas in which each is the only independent distributor of
the newspaper.
Two of the four factors the Court discussed in Albrecht and ARCO
are not applicable because the distributor does not compete with other
dealers. We need not worry about the ability of the dealer to compete
with other dealers, and there are no other dealers with whom the com-
157. Id. at 1892.
158. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 317 n.17 (5th Cir. 1978) (observing in
dicta that retail customers would not have standing to challenge maximum price-fixing agreement
because they would not be injured by it).
159. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1895.
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plaining dealer could engage in service and convenience competition. As
to the fourth Albrecht factor, it may not apply to any situation. If the
price-fixing agreement really attains the attributes of an arrangement
fixing minimum prices, one of two scenarios is possible: either the
dealer benefits from the higher prices and thus has no injury in fact, or
the dealer loses profits because it could sell substantially more newspa-
pers at a lower price. In the latter case, however, the dealer's claim is
not that it is the victim of a maximum price-fixing agreement, but that
it is the victim of a minimum price-fixing agreement. e00
The only remaining Albrecht factor is the notion that prices could
be too low for the dealer to furnish essential services and conveniences
for which consumers are willing to pay.1 6 1 What the Albrecht and
ARCO Courts had in mind as essential services is unclear, but examples
of conveniences in the newspaper industry for which some consumers
might be willing to pay could include special delivery requirements such
as placement of the newspaper on the customer's porch or protecting
the newspaper from inclement weather by placing it in a waterproof
bag. By being barred from charging higher or additional prices for such
services, a dealer might argue, post-ARCO, that it was effectively pre-
vented from providing these services to consumers. Under a simplistic
analysis, by introducing evidence that some customers wished to have
special deliveries or waterproof bags and that it was effectively pre-
vented from providing such services at the vertically imposed maximum
prices, a dealer might argue that it has suffered the anticompetitive
consequences detailed in Albrecht.
This argument contains a serious flaw. If subscribers wanted addi-
tional services, the publisher would encourage the provision of such ser-
vices because it would make the newspaper more valuable to the
subscriber. This would expand the demand for the newspaper, thereby
increasing circulation. In turn, the increased circulation would increase
advertising revenue and make the publisher better off. Thus, it is hard
to envision circumstances under which the publisher would intention-
ally set maximum resale prices that preclude the provision of desired
services. This, of course, does not preclude a publisher from making a
mistake, but the antitrust laws need not be used to correct managerial
error. In any event, such mistakes will reduce the publisher's profits
and thereby create incentives to correct errors in business judgment.
160. If this were the case, the frustrated discounter would complain of an illegal resale price-
maintenance scheme. For an analysis of antitrust injury in these circumstances, see Blair & Harri-
son, supra note 10, at 1556-61.
161. 110 S. Ct. at 1890. This concern is misguided because the publisher or gasoline refiner
has no incentive to preclude the provision of such services. In fact, the supplier benefits from such
services because they expand the demand for its product.
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The dealer's would-be position has three additional problems. The
first is quantitative. Suppose that the dealer can show that some con-
sumers would indeed prefer to pay more for additional services. How
many such consumers are necessary to establish antitrust injury? If, for
example, five percent of the customers on a dealer's route would pay
more, but ninety-five percent prefer lower prices and existing service,
should that fact confer standing to sue on the dealer?
Second, but more important, the finding that an exclusive route
dealer has antitrust injury directly contradicts the ARCO Court's opin-
ion that "[w]hen a manufacturer provides a dealer an exclusive area
within which to distribute a product, the manufacturer's decision to fix
a maximum resale price may actually protect consumers against ex-
ploitation by the dealer acting as a local monopolist,"'1 62 and that when
an exclusive distributorship "is the most efficient means of distribution,
the public is not served by forcing the manufacturer to abandon this
method and resort to self-distribution or competing distributors. "163
That carefully constructed passage endorsed the views of the Al-
brecht dissenters that maximum price fixing protects consumers from
price gouging by distributors, and noted that compelling the manufac-
turer to abandon vertical maximum price fixing could be contrary to
the public interest. 6" Given the Court's strong statement of its con-
cerns, as well as its recognition that much of the rationale for Albrecht
was rendered obsolete by the Court's abrogation of the per se ban on
exclusive territories, 65 the Court could not have intended to expose
consumers to dealer exploitation, or force the publisher to abandon the
most efficient means of distribution, simply because price ceilings may
prevent some consumers from receiving (and paying for) additional ser-
vices in certain deliveries.
Finally, if the exclusive territory dealer had standing, how would
damages be determined? In the pre-ARCO maximum resale price-main-
tenance cases, the typical measure of damages was lost profits-the dif-
ference between the distributor's actual profit and the profit it would
162. Id. at 1894 n.13.
163. Id.
164. The adverse consequences of permitting pricing freedom are not removed by competi-
tive bidding for the exclusive routes. Those competing for each route will bid up the price to a
level that corresponds to the monopoly profit that the winner could earn. In this way, the pub-
lisher will be able to extract all of the profit that the resulting inefficient pricing will generate, but
the outcome for consumer welfare is unchanged because the home-delivered price will still be
above the optimal level from the publisher's perspective.
165. "The procompetitive potential of a vertical maximum price restraint is more evident
now than . . . when Albrecht was decided, because exclusive territorial arrangements . . . were
unlawful per se in 1968." 110 S. Ct. at 1894 n.13.
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have had if there had been no price-fixing agreement.1 e6 Although such
damages may relate to the injury in fact suffered by the dealer, they do
not reflect the anticompetitive consequences detailed in Albrecht or the
anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's behavior. Providing the
dealer with lost profits would penalize the publisher for conduct that
benefited consumers and pay the dealer for its injury in fact, rather
than for its antitrust injury which may not exist. In theory, the dealer's
damages could be limited to the anticompetitive consequences suffered
by the dealer. But how would a jury measure damages suffered by the
dealer as a result of the dealer's inability to make special deliveries?
These damages would have to be calculated as lost profits on lost sales,
which are speculative at best given the nature of the dealer's claim.
Moreover, although the ARCO Court spoke of the benefits to inter-
brand competition that vertical price fixing might achieve, the bene-
fits to consumers are arguably greater when there is no interbrand
competition. When the publisher competes with another newspaper (as-
suming that newspaper is sold by different dealers), that competition in
itself may force dealers to keep prices down. When the newspaper faces
no real competition in sales to subscribers, the market power of the ex-
clusive distributor will be greater and, therefore, the benefit to consum-
ers of maximum price ceilings will be greater. The benefits of maximum
resale price maintenance are especially strong in the newspaper indus-
try because the publisher has a strong incentive to keep prices low.
Most newspapers receive over two-thirds of their revenues from adver-
tising. 6 Thus, the publisher needs low circulation prices to attract
readers that advertisers will pay to reach. 6 9
B. Example 2: Competing Dealers or Products
When the dealer competes either with other dealers of the manu-
facturer's product or with sellers of a competing product,17 0 a finding of
antitrust injury may be more plausible. If dealer pricing is unduly re-
stricted by the manufacturer, ARCO and Albrecht suggest that the
dealer may be driven out of business by other dealers and unable to
166. See, e.g., Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 483 (D.D.C.
1977).
167. See 110 S. Ct. at 1894 n.13.
168. Circulation revenue of a composite large city newspaper accounted for 19.5% of total
revenue in 1967, 15.6% in 1971, 20.8% in 1975, and 22.8% in 1978. For a medium-size daily news-
paper, circulation revenue appears to be more important. It was 28.3% of total revenue in 1971
and 29.2% in 1978. B. COMPAINE, supra note 29, at 18-19.
169. See J. Rosse, supra note 29.
170. If there is a competing newspaper, but that competing newspaper is sold exclusively by
the same dealer, the dealer would still have the "monopoly" suggested by the ARCO Court.
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engage in nonprice competition. Thus, newspaper consumers might be
deprived of the special deliveries discussed above, or gasoline consum-
ers might lose the ability to pay by credit card or to have an attendant
pump their gasoline or clean their windshields. In addition, the need for
protecting consumers from price-gouging distributors may be dimin-
ished because competition with other dealers or products could act to
keep the dealers' prices down.
A finding that these nonexclusive dealers have antitrust injury,
however, has at least two problems. First, it produces the anomalous
result that although the competing dealers allegedly targeted by a verti-
cal price-fixing scheme (like the USA Petroleum dealers in ARCO) do
not have standing, the dealers (like the ARCO-brand dealers in ARCO)
who entered into the price-fixing agreement with the manufacturer do
have standing.
Second, assuming arguendo that the dealer has suffered some of
the anticompetitive consequences alleged in Albrecht, the question re-
mains of which issues would be tried. Is it enough for the dealer to show
that it has suffered some of the injuries described by Albrecht, for ex-
ample, that some consumers desire and would pay for more services? Or
should such consequences to the dealer be weighed against the benefit
to consumers of the maximum vertical price-fixing agreement? The
Court's concern for the protection of consumers and its recognition of
the benefits to consumers of manufacturer imposed price ceilings indi-
cates that the courts should apply a balancing test. As the Court noted,
the same conduct may "in some respects. . . reduce competition, [and]
in other respects increase competition. 1 7 1 If a dealer merely has to
show that it falls within one or more of the Albrecht pigeonholes, the
law will deter conduct that may have some anticompetitive conse-
quences, but which, on balance, is procompetitive.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A RULE OF REASON/ANTITRUST INJURY
STANDARD
The ARCO Court was not asked to overrule Albrecht and, similar
to the actions of the lower courts in the newspaper distribution cases, it
ameliorated, but did not eliminate, Albrecht's harms. The Court held
that a dealer does not suffer antitrust injury from a nonpredatory verti-
cal maximum price-fixing agreement between competing dealers and
those competing dealers' supplier, even though the complaining dealer
may have lost sales or have been forced out of business as a result. Al-
though the Court thereby denied standing to competing dealers, the
Court suggested in dicta, somewhat less thoughtfully, that either the
171. ARCO 110 S. Ct. at 1894.
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dealers who are the parties to the price-fixing agreement or consumers
may bring suit if they suffer the anticompetitive consequences detailed
in Albrecht.
The notion that dealers or consumers may have antitrust injury
contradicts much of the Court's opinion, especially its comments that
"low prices . . cannot give rise to antitrust injury," and that vertical
maximum resale price fixing may protect consumers from exploitation
by dealers. Providing standing to dealers and consumers when only the
Albrecht factors have been shown could lead both to the condemnation
of conduct which, on balance, is procompetitive and to the award of
damages in direct proportion to the benefit to consumers of the conduct
of which the dealer complains.
One solution would be to extend the Court's holding in ARCO that
bans suits by competing dealers to prohibit suits by consumers and the
dealers who were parties to the vertical maximum price-fixing agree-
ment. Under such a rule, some persons who suffered some of the alleged
harms identified in Albrecht, such as the inability to offer or receive
certain services, will not have legal redress. Courts, however, would
avoid protracted litigation on such amorphous issues as whether con-
sumers would have preferred and paid for delivery of their newspaper
in a plastic bag and, if so, how many consumers would have paid more,
and the amount they would have paid. The case for extending the
ARCO rule to bar suits by consumers and price-fixing dealers is particu-
larly strong when the dealer has an exclusive territory and is an argua-
ble monopolist, because vertical maximum price fixing protects the
public from price gouging by the distributor.
An alternative position, and one we believe is implicitly required at
a minimum by ARCO, is to convert the dealer's antitrust injury stan-
dard to a rule of reason inquiry.17 2 That is, rather than grant standing
to any dealer or consumer who suffers any of the injuries identified in
Albrecht in any degree, that dealer or consumer would be required to
show that for the vertical maximum price-fixing agreement as a whole,
the "anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects." Such
a rule of reason/antitrust injury standard would not eliminate litigation
entirely, but it should avoid the judicial condemnation of conduct that
is, on the whole, procompetitive.
172. For a good examination of the rule of reason, see P. AREEDA, 7 ANTITRUST LAW M 1500-
11 (1986); Posner, supra note 3. In addition, see Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Develop-
ments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason,
27 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1979); Gellhorn & Tatham, Making Sense Out of the Rule of Reason, 35
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155 (1984); Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial Examina-
tion" of Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1984).
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Additionally, under the rule of reason or antitrust injury standard,
lost profits should be rejected as the measure of dealer damages. Per-
mitting lost profits as damages-especially when trebled-penalizes
conduct that benefits consumers. In theory, damages could be limited
to the precise economic harm suffered by the dealer due to any an-
ticompetitive consequences of vertical maximum price fixing and re-
duced by the amount of procompetitive effects. The determination and
quantification of such alleged damages at trial, however, would be ex-
tremely difficult and speculative, at best. A no-damage rule would be
the better policy. Dealers would still be free to obtain injunctive relief,
and the federal enforcement authorities would continue to have the
power in their discretion to bring actions against vertical maximum
price-fixing agreements that they believe are contrary to the public
interest.

